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Pity the Child: The Age of 
Delinquency in New York 
 
Merril Sobie  
 
In 1899 the State of Illinois established the nation‘s first 
juvenile court.1  Quickly replicated throughout the country, 
forty-six of the then forty-eight states, including New York, had 
established separate tribunals devoted to children‘s cases by 
1925.2  Although virtually every state initially restricted the 
then novel court‘s jurisdiction to children less than sixteen 
years of age,3 the overwhelming majority increased the juvenile 
delinquency jurisdictional age in the decades immediately 
following initial enactment.4  Today, in forty-eight states, a 
child who is sixteen years of age will be adjudicated in a 
juvenile or family court.5  Only two states, New York and North 
Carolina, adhere to the original early twentieth century age 
limitation.6  The present alignment dates from 2007, when 
Connecticut became the forty-eighth state to embrace the 
national norm.7  The next year, North Carolina established a 
commission to consider raising the jurisdictional age and 
recently a relevant legislative committee has introduced and 
 
 Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; Chair, New York 
State Bar Association, Committee on Children & the Law; New York State 
Bar Fellow; Member, American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Committee; 
McKinney‘s Commentator for the Family Court Act. 
1. Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.  The Court‘s jurisdiction 
included juvenile delinquency and the neglect or abuse of a child by a parent 
or other person responsible for the child. 
2. See PAUL W. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 172-73 (1949).  A 
―juvenile delinquent‖ is a person under a specified age who has committed an 
act which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime.  The two 1925 
―holdout‖ states were Maine and Wyoming—both of which had joined the 
―juvenile court‖ bandwagon by the mid-1940s. 
3. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
5. Several states have established family courts, which combine cases 
involving children, such as delinquency and child neglect, with other intra-
family cases, such as domestic violence and divorce. 
6. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2008). 
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (2009). 
1
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approved legislation to increase the jurisdictional age 
limitation in that state.8  New York, and only New York, 
stubbornly maintains the lower age threshold of adult criminal 
responsibility without any consideration of the alternative. 
This paper will first outline the national history of juvenile 
courts, followed by New York‘s unique historical experience.  It 
will then discuss the recent Connecticut legislation, the North 
Carolina efforts, and other twenty-first century developments 
in juvenile courts‘ jurisdiction.  Finally, the paper will discuss 
the desirability of similar New York legislation that would 
raise the jurisdictional age limitation, as well as its possible 
ramifications. 
 
A Short National History 
 
On the eve of the twentieth century, Illinois established 
the first Juvenile Court, a tribunal largely dedicated to the 
rehabilitation of children who had either engaged in criminal 
activities, or whose parents had neglected, abused or 
abandoned them.9  In one sense, the court was revolutionary—
for the first time in Anglo-American legal history a separate 
court, presided over by specialized ―children‘s judges,‖ 
determined the lives of children.  Viewed from a different 
perspective, the Illinois court was the culmination of juvenile 
justice developments that had occurred throughout the 
nineteenth century, including, notably, the adjudication and 
treatment of youths who were found to have violated the penal 
law provisions. 
The evolution commenced when the New York House of 
Refuge was chartered in 1824,10 quickly followed by the 
establishment of similar institutions in Pennsylvania11 and 
Massachusetts.12  The movement to ameliorate the 
consequences of a criminal conviction by developing houses of 
refuge, reform schools, and private religious-based as well as 
 
8. See S. 1048, 2009-2010 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2009). 
9. Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131. 
10. Act of Jan. 28, 1826, 1826 N.Y. Laws 18, 18.  See also ROBERT M. 
MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1825-1940, at 3-4 (1973); infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
11. See MENNEL, supra note 10, at 3-5. 
12. See id. 
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non-sectarian residential homes, expanded steadily throughout 
the century.13  ―By 1890 nearly every state outside of the South 
had some type of reform school for boys and often a separate 
institution for girls. . . . [T]hese institutions cared for most of 
the delinquent children in the United States and for numerous 
destitute children as well.‖14 
By the late nineteenth century, state legislatures had also 
established a uniform age limitation of sixteen for placement in 
a specialized juvenile institution: ―In every school, children had 
to be younger than 16 at the time of commitment; the lower age 
for commitment varied . . . between 7 and 11.‖15  The national 
age standard followed several decades in which some states 
experimented with different age limitations.16  The reasoning 
behind the age sixteen national consensus is unclear.  Perhaps 
in the late Victorian era, children above that age were viewed 
as young adults; or perhaps the jurisdictional age was simply 
copied from state to state. 
The 1899 Illinois Act was quickly replicated throughout 
the United States.  The ―watershed‖ year was 1903, when at 
least six states enacted virtually identical laws establishing 
juvenile courts.17  Not surprisingly, the natural standard of age 
at the time, sixteen, was almost universally followed.  In 1903, 
for example, California,18 Pennsylvania,19 Maryland,20 Rhode 
Island,21 and Indiana22 all established age sixteen as the 
jurisdictional cut-off age for their newly-founded juvenile 
 
13. ―For a quarter of a century [1825-1850] the activities of these three 
institutions defined institutional treatment of juvenile delinquents.‖  Id. at 4. 
14. Id. at 49. 
15. Id. 
16. See infra pp. 1067-76 (discussing New York‘s experience). 
17. See INT‘L PRISON COMM‘N, CHILDREN‘S COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS, H.R. REP. NO. 58-701, at app. 165-
87 (1904). 
18. Act of Feb. 26, 1903, 1903 Cal. Stat. 44 (―This act shall apply only to 
children under the age of sixteen (16) . . . .‖).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 58-701, 
at app. 165-68. 
19. Act of Mar. 10, 1903, 1903 Ind. Acts 516, 518.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 
58-701, at app. 182-85. 
20. Act of Apr. 23, 1903, 1903 Pa. Laws 274.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 58-
701, at app. 185-86. 
21. Act of Apr. 8, 1904, 1904 Md. Laws 906.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 58-
701, at app. 187. 
22. Act of June 15, 1898, 1898 R.I. Acts & Resolves 40.  See also H.R. 
REP. NO. 58-701, at app. 179-82. 
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courts. 
Within one decade, twenty-two jurisdictions had 
established juvenile courts, and by 1925, every state save two 
had enacted similar legislation.23  The juvenile court movement 
had spread like wildfire.  As noted, an age limitation of sixteen 
had characterized the initial legislation.  Expanding twentieth 
century social work and child psychology concepts, coupled 
with the fact that the new courts were generally perceived as 
successful, however, influenced legislatures to increase the 
courts‘ jurisdictional reach.  By 1927, twenty-eight of the forty-
eight states had raised the jurisdictional age to eighteen, and 
most of the remaining twenty states had raised the age 
limitation to seventeen.24  At the turn of the twenty-first 
century, thirty-seven states maintained age eighteen, ten 
states and the District of Columbia opted for age seventeen, 
and only three states, Connecticut, North Carolina and New 
York, remained unchanged at age sixteen.  Connecticut joined 
the ranks of ―age eighteen‖ states in 2008,25 thus raising the 
total number to thirty-eight and leaving North Carolina26 and 
New York as the only current holdouts adhering to the original, 
circa 1900, jurisdictional limitation.27 
Significantly, the jurisdictional ―juvenile court age‖ has 
almost always been identical, regardless of the type of 
proceeding.28  As has been noted, age sixteen was the original 
common jurisdictional age for juvenile delinquency, status 
offenses, and child neglect or abuse; today it is eighteen.  As 
noted by one commentator, ―[t]he jurisdictional age is generally 
the same for all children and all forms of conduct.‖29  
Nationally, the cut-off age for child neglect or abuse is 
eighteen, while thirty-eight of the fifty states maintain the 
 
23. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 172. 
24. See generally HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1972).  Wyoming, the last state to establish a juvenile court, had set 
the age limitation of age nineteen, but reduced the age to eighteen in 1993.  
Act of Feb. 16, 1993, 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws 1, 1-2.  See also Thomas v. 
Thomas, 913 P.2d 854, 855 (Wyo. 1996). 
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (2009). 
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) (2010). 
27. North Carolina is presently considering an increase.  See supra note 
8 and accompanying text. 
28. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 10 (2d ed. 2009). 
29. Id. at 10. 
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same age for juvenile delinquency.30 
However, the juvenile delinquency age limitation is not 
absolute.  Most states adhere to the general rule, but exempt 
very violent offenses committed by older adolescents.  The 
exemptions vary, as do the implementation mechanisms.  The 
majority of states provide for ―transfer,‖ whereby juvenile 
courts determine whether an older adolescent who is accused of 
committing a violent felony should be treated as a juvenile or, 
alternatively, should be transferred to adult courts for criminal 
prosecution.31  Other states permit a prosecutor to ―direct file‖ 
in the criminal court, thereby by-passing the juvenile court.32  
Still others exempt certain enumerated offenses committed by 
older children from juvenile court jurisdiction entirely.33  
Although there is considerable variation, no state in the Union 
treats a seventeen-year-old murderer as a juvenile delinquent, 
and most exclude violent assaults and first degree sex offenses.  
Nonetheless, the limited exceptions prove the rule.  The vast 
majority of American children under the age of eighteen who 
engage in criminal activities are deemed to be delinquent 
rather than criminal.34 
 
 
30. The jurisdictional age limitation is also at least eighteen in several 
other nations, including Canada, the United Kingdom, China, and France.  
See Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and 
the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1443, 1447 (2008).  Austria, 
Germany, and Spain have extended the juvenile court age to twenty-one.  See 
id. 
31. See DAVIS, supra note 28, at 37-48. 
32. See id. 
33. See DAVIS, supra note 28, at 30-43 (providing a detailed analysis of 
the often byzantine procedures). 
34. An interesting aspect of juvenile delinquency and the age of the 
children is the lack of a minimum age, or a very low minimum age, at which a 
child may be charged with committing a crime and hence be deemed a 
juvenile delinquent.  Only fifteen states maintain a minimum age, ranging 
from six to ten.  See DON CIPRIANI, CHILDREN‘S RIGHTS AND THE MINIMUM AGE 
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 117-18 (2009).  See, e.g., 
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2008) (establishing a minimum age 
of seven).  Almost all developed nations maintain higher minimum ages; for 
example, in Australia and Britain the minimum age is 10, see CIPRIANI, 
supra, at 188, 220, and in Germany the age is 14, see id. at 198. 
5
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New York History 
 
In tandem with the national history, the reform and 
rehabilitation of New York children who have engaged in 
criminal activity—and their segregation from adult 
transgressors—dates from the early nineteenth century.  In 
1816, two prominent Quaker reformers, Thomas Eddy and 
John Griscom, established the New York Society for the 
Prevention of Pauperism for the purpose of advocating and 
implementing juvenile justice reforms.35  Vividly portraying the 
vice of incarcerating children in the adult penitentiary,36 the 
Society publicized the plight of children accused of committing 
non-violent crimes and lobbied extensively for legislative 
reform.37  In 1824, the Society succeeded, securing legislation 
incorporating the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile 
Delinquents and authorizing the establishment of a New York 
House of Refuge to rehabilitate juvenile transgressors.38  Two 
years later, the state legislature authorized the courts to place 
with the newly constructed House of Refuge, in lieu of 
imprisonment, any child convicted of committing a criminal 
offense anywhere in the state.39 
Pursuant to the original legislation, placement by a court 
 
35. See ROBERT S. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE, ORIGINS OF JUVENILE 
REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 1815-1857, at 23-30 (1969). 
36.  
 
We are sorry to be informed, by the mayor, that since he has 
administered our criminal jurisprudence, the unpleasant 
task has devolved on him, of sentencing boys, from twelve to 
fifteen and seventeen years of age, several times to the 
penitentiary. . . . [I]f any thing can destroy the 
ingenuousness and rectitude of youth, and open a road to 
ruin, it is the polluting society of those veterans in guilt and 
wickedness, who hold their reign in our prisons of 
punishment . . . . 
 
MANAGERS OF THE SOC‘Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 34-35 (1820). 
37. See MERRIL SOBIE, THE CREATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF 
NEW YORK‘S CHILDREN‘S LAWS 26-28 (1987). 
38. Act of Mar. 29, 1824, 1824 N.Y. Laws 110. 
39. Act of Jan. 28, 1826, 1826 N.Y. Laws 18, 18.  Construction of the 
House of Refuge, located in New York City at Broadway and Twenty-Third 
Street, an area later developed as Madison Park, was apparently completed 
by 1826. 
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was purely discretionary, but in 1830 the legislature 
empowered the Governor to authorize prison administrators to 
―. . . convey any convicts who shall be under the age of 
seventeen years, to the house of refuge in the [C]ity of New-
York.‖40  The transition was completed in 1846, when the 
legislature established the Western House of Refuge near 
Rochester,41 and mandated the commitment of convicted 
children to a house of refuge, thereby precluding imprisonment 
in a penitentiary: 
 
[T]he courts of criminal jurisdiction of the several 
counties . . . shall sentence to said house of 
refuge every male under the age of eighteen 
years, and every female under the age of 
seventeen years, who shall be convicted before 
such court of any felony.42 
 
Remarkably, in 1846, New York had prohibited the 
imprisonment of sixteen and seventeen year old children, an 
achievement which has eluded this state throughout the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.43 
The houses of refuge were privately maintained, albeit 
publicly funded.44  Governmentally operated facilities were 
unknown until the twentieth century.  The next step in the 
evolution of children‘s laws was the post-civil war development 
of child protective laws.  The first child neglect statute was 
enacted in 1877.45  Simultaneously, the State authorized and 
funded the development of residential child care agencies for 
 
40. Act of Apr. 16, 1830, 1830 N.Y. Laws 205, 205.  In permitting prison 
administrators to supersede court-ordered imprisonment, the statute appears 
to constitute a remarkable infringement of judicial discretion. 
41. Act of May 8, 1846, 1846 N.Y. Laws 150, 150. 
42. Id. at 154. 
43. See id.  It applies at least to boys, who then and now account for the 
overwhelming majority of delinquents.  Why the legislature excluded 
seventeen year old girls is mysterious.  It also bears mentioning that the 
early houses of refuge were strict, locked facilities, akin to the present secure 
training schools.  The goal was to segregate adolescents for purposes of 
punishment and, hopefully, to rehabilitate the children through isolation and 
time. 
44. See SOBIE, supra note 37, at 29. 
45. Act of June 6, 1877, 1877 N.Y. Laws 486. 
7
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abandoned, neglected, and delinquent children.46  An 1884 Act 
mandated that children under the age of sixteen who were 
convicted of misdemeanors be committed to child care agencies 
in lieu of commitment to prisons or houses of refuge; while 
children under the age of sixteen who were convicted of felonies 
could, in the discretion of the court, be ―. . . placed in charge of 
any suitable person or institution willing to receive him.‖47  The 
dispositional alternatives, circa 1884, closely resemble the 
current Family Court Act dispositional provisions which govern 
juvenile delinquency cases.48 
The late nineteenth century legislation, unlike the 1846 
statute, established age sixteen as the jurisdictional age 
limitation.  Regardless of the possible rationale for excluding 
sixteen and seventeen-year-old children,49 New York‘s firm 
policy of excluding older adolescents had taken root. 
With the turn of the twentieth century, the emphasis 
shifted from dispositional rules to structural and procedural 
reform.  Following several temporary measures, the New York 
legislature authorized separate Children‘s Court parts 
throughout the state in 1903—precisely the year in which 
several states50 were enacting more radical legislation 
establishing independent juvenile courts: 
 
All cases involving the commitment or trial 
of children, actually or apparently under the age 
of sixteen years, for any violation of law, in any 
court shall be heard and determined by such 
court, at suitable times to be designated 
therefore by it, separate and apart from the trial 
of other criminal cases . . . in a separate 
courtroom to be known as the children‘s court . . . 
.51 
 
46. See SOBIE, supra note 37, at 60-62. 
47. Act of Mar. 21, 1884, 1884 N.Y. Laws 44, 47. 
48. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2 (McKinney 2008). 
49. Perhaps the legislature thought that the increasing ameliorative 
provisions were unsuitable for older youths. 
50. See supra notes 18-22. 
51. Act of May 6, 1903, 1903 N.Y. Laws 676, 677.  An 1892 predecessor 
statute mandated that children under the age of sixteen be tried separately 
from adults, and that the courts maintain separate records for children.  See 
Act of Apr. 5, 1982, 1892 N.Y. Laws 459, 459-60.  The progression was from 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/8
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Two years later, the legislature stipulated that the commission 
of a crime by a child under the age of sixteen, which was not 
capital or punishable by life imprisonment, would be deemed a 
misdemeanor only,52 and, in 1909, the legislature 
decriminalized most youthful offenses, formalizing the term 
―juvenile delinquency‖: 
 
A child of more than seven and less than sixteen 
years of age, who shall commit any act or 
omission which, if committed by an adult, would 
be a crime not punishable by death or life 
imprisonment, shall not be deemed guilty of any 
crime, but of juvenile delinquency only . . . .53 
 
New York thereby joined the large number of states that 
had substituted a juvenile delinquency finding for a criminal 
conviction.54  Following the early twentieth century national 
norm, the legislature established age sixteen as the 
jurisdictional ceiling—or, more accurately, continued the late 
nineteenth century limitation.  New York, however, did not at 
that time establish a separate juvenile court, preferring instead 
the continuation of its specialized Children‘s Court parts. 
The Children‘s Court parts were nevertheless short lived.  
Finally bowing to the national movement, New York 
established the New York State Children‘s Court in 1922 for 
counties outside of New York City,55 and, two years later, 
enacted a similar Act to govern the City.56  For purposes of the 
Act, a ―child‖ was defined as a person under sixteen years of 
age,57 a definition which encompassed delinquency, status 
offenses and child neglect.  In fact, from the late nineteenth 
century until the establishment of the Family Court in 1962,58 
 
segregated proceedings and records to segregated court parts, i.e., separate 
courtrooms. 
52. Act of May 29, 1905, 1905 N.Y. Laws 1664, 1666. 
53. Act of May 25, 1909, 1909 N.Y. Laws 1163, 1163. 
54. See, e.g., supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
55. Act of Apr. 10, 1922, 1922 N.Y. Laws 1259, 1261. 
56. Act of Apr. 23, 1924, 1924 N.Y. Laws 493, 494-95. 
57. Id. at 495. 
58. Act of Apr. 24, 1962, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3043. 
9
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a span embracing almost a century, the jurisdictional age 
remained fixed at sixteen.  The Court could not entertain a 
case involving a child above that age, regardless of whether the 
matter involved a juvenile delinquent, a status offender, or a 
child who was the victim of child neglect or abuse. 
As the twentieth century progressed, adherence to the low 
threshold criminal age of responsibility age became 
controversial; reform advocacy intensified as state after state 
increased the jurisdictional age limitation.  A 1931 New York 
State Crime Commission report criticized the rigid 
differentiation between the Children‘s Court and the Criminal 
Court, and suggested remediation (however non-specific): 
 
The sharp distinction in the criminal law 
between children over sixteen and those under 
sixteen is well illustrated in New York City, 
where the Children‘s Court is under equity 
proceedings.  A child under sixteen, since 1925, 
may not be charged with a criminal act.  In all 
breaches of the peace, save for a capital offense, 
he becomes the ward of the court, rather than its 
prisoner.  He is not arraigned as a criminal . . . 
nor is he fingerprinted or otherwise classified for 
purposes of criminal identification. . . .  He may 
not be detained in a jail . . . the services of 
physicians, psychiatrists and of psychologists are 
sometimes provided, to assist the judge in 
determining treatment. 
. . . If, however, a child is above the age of 
sixteen, by as much as a single day, he is subject 
to all the rigors of the adult courts; of police 
arrest, of jail detention . . . and, in many 
instances, of sentence as a felon to a reformatory 
or state prison where he mingles with hardened 
adult criminals. . . .  The paradox in this 
situation has been apparent to many for a long 
while.  From a remedial point of view, in light of 
the abuses to which adolescents are subject, 
when in contact with the criminal law, a 
practical solution can probably be arrived at . . . 
to modify the harshness of the criminal law in its 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/8
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relation to adolescent offenders.59 
 
The 1931 Crime Commission Report, which reads as 
though it could have been written yesterday, did not influence 
the legislature and thus remains relevant.  Later that decade, 
―. . . the Joint Legislative Committee on Children‘s Court 
Jurisdiction and Juvenile Delinquency (1937 to 1942) explored 
whether the juvenile delinquency age should be increased.  It 
found ‗strongly divided opinion‘ and recommended that in the 
absence of ‗any kind of majority sentiment‘ of the sort that 
produced the Children‘s Court, the jurisdictional age be 
maintained at 16.‖60  Revisiting the issue shortly before the 
establishment of the Family Court, the Temporary Commission 
on the Courts ―. . . concluded that any increase in the juvenile 
delinquency age in the Children‘s courts or any expansion of its 
jurisdiction to include youthful offenders would be 
‗undesirable.‘‖61  The continuing efforts of children‘s advocates, 
bolstered by the fact that, by then, virtually every other state 
had raised the jurisdictional age, could not persuade New 
York‘s legislative leaders. 
This brings us to the 1962 Family Court Act.  At the 1961 
Constitutional Convention, which established the Family 
Court, the issue of New York‘s low age threshold was debated 
extensively.  Finding an absence of a strong consensus, the 
Convention deferred a decision.  The Constitution, drafted at 
the Convention and enacted by the legislature and the public at 
large, was accordingly intentionally flexible and incorporated 
the following non-age specific provision: 
 
The family court shall have jurisdiction over 
the following classes of actions and proceedings 
which shall be originated in such family court in 
the manner provided by law: (1) the protection, 
treatment, correction and commitment of those 
minors who are in need of the exercise of the 
authority of the court because of circumstances of 
 
59. HARRY M. SHULMAN, THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER: A STATISTICAL STUDY 
OF CRIME AMONG THE 16-20 YEAR AGE GROUP IN NEW YORK CITY 150-52 (1931). 
60. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, YOUNG 
OFFENDERS AND COURT REORGANIZATION 5 (1963). 
61. Id. 
11
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neglect, delinquency or dependency, as the 
legislature may determine . . . .62 
 
Explaining the Convention‘s decision to defer a 
jurisdictional modification and to draft a remarkably flexible 
and unique constitutional provision,63 the framers overtly 
permitted, indeed invited, a change by a simple legislative act, 
rather than by the cumbersome constitutional amendment 
process.  The official legislative committee comment to the 
original Family Court Act section states the reasoning: 
 
This section follows existing law in limiting 
juvenile delinquency to persons under sixteen 
years of age.  This decision is tentative and 
subject to change upon completion of a study of 
the Youthful Offender Act and the Wayward 
Minor Law and observation of the functioning of 
the new court with the program of law guardians 
established under Article 1.  The Joint 
Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization 
plans to complete the study and submit 
legislation in 1963.64 
 
The Joint Legislative Committee indeed completed a study 
in 1963.  Its published report, however, came to no firm 
decision, concluding with the comment: ―We look forward to the 
advice and recommendations of others on these difficult 
matters.‖65  The 1963 report final paragraph included the 
following bold statement: 
 
Given this constitutional language, this 
Committee has concluded that the Legislature is 
under a constitutional mandate to examine again 
the question of whether the juvenile delinquency 
age should be changed or other arrangements 
 
62. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 13(b). 
63. Other jurisdictional grants are explicit. 
64. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, THE 
FAMILY COURT ACT REPORT 110 (1962) (emphasis added).  
65. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, supra 
note 60, at 3. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/8
2010] PITY THE CHILD 1073 
made for dealing with young offenders.  In its 
judgment, the decisions of the past must now be 
subordinated to the policies of the new 
constitutional amendment.  And these policies 
require a practical judgment, based on current 
experiences and realistic estimates, as to how the 
courts of the unified state court system may be 
most effectively used to deal with problems of 
youth.66 
 
At that point the legislative history ends.  The promise to 
submit legislation in 1963 was apparently unfulfilled.  The 
constitutional mandate to re-examine the question of whether 
the juvenile delinquency age should be changed was ignored.  
The ―tentative‖ 1962 decision has remained in effect for forty-
five years, with, astonishingly, no recorded organized effort to 
seek a modification. 
Interestingly, the 1961 Constitutional Convention 
differentiated delinquency, status offenses, and child neglect 
for jurisdictional age purposes.  As discussed, virtually every 
state, including New York, had originally limited juvenile court 
jurisdiction across the board to age sixteen.67  In subsequent 
decades, almost every state had raised its age limitation for the 
three major children‘s law causes of action, continuing the 
principle that a child below a certain threshold age should be 
treated as a child, regardless of the type of proceeding.  New 
York, while adhering to the principle of a unified age, 
steadfastly refused to increase the original jurisdictional 
limitation.  For almost one century, from 1865 to 1962, the 
jurisdictional age for purposes of delinquency, child neglect, 
and status offenses remained frozen at sixteen. 
The 1962 Family Court Act finally raised the jurisdictional 
age limitation for girls accused of committing status offenses or 
alleged to be neglected to eighteen, while maintaining age 
sixteen as the cutoff for similarly situated boys.68  The 
modification, which appears to constitute a compromise, broke 
the, by then, eighty-year policy of parity, which had been a 
 
66. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, supra 
note 64, at 6. 
67. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
68. Act of Apr. 24, 1962, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3043, 3106.  
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constant theme both in New York and at the national level.  
Fifteen years later, the jurisdictional age of neglect was raised 
to eighteen for boys, inaugurating the present jurisdictional 
limitation for both genders.69  In 1972, the New York Court of 
Appeals had found the gender differentiation for status 
offenses unconstitutional,70 effectively restoring age sixteen for 
that cause of action, and prompting the 1977 statutory change 
for child neglect cases.71  Finally, in 2001 the legislature raised 
the status offense age to eighteen for both sexes.72  Ironically, 
the legislative findings underpinning the 2001 amendment cite 
―. . . a recognition that teens under the age of 18 need 
supervision, guidance and support to grow and mature into 
responsible adults.‖73  The findings could just as readily justify 
raising the juvenile delinquency age limitation. 
Today, New York maintains an age limitation of eighteen 
for child protective actions (neglect or abuse) and for status 
offense actions.74  In that respect, the state adheres to the 
national norm.  However, this state has thus far failed to 
similarly adjust delinquency jurisdiction in accord with the 
national consensus.  In most states, a child remains a child 
until the age of emancipation, regardless of the issue.75  In New 
York, a child remains a child until the age of emancipation, 
unless and until he is accused of committing a crime. 
 
Twenty-First Century Revelations 
 
The perception of adolescent criminality has been 
significantly altered in the past decade, moving from a ―get 
tough on child predators‖ paradigm to one which emphasizes 
the diminished responsibility of children.  Several factors have 
contributed to the ameliorative trend: a) a major decrease in 
the juvenile crime rate, and an even more pronounced 
diminution in the juvenile violent crime rate; b) studies 
 
69. Act of Aug. 1, 1977, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1. 
70. See A. v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 89 (1972). 
71. Act of Aug. 1, 1977, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1. 
72. Act of Oct. 29, 2001, 2001 N.Y. Laws 2777, 2824.  
73. Id. 
74. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 712, 1012 (McKinney 2009). 
75. Although that is compromised by waiver and transfer provisions in 
several states.   
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showing conclusively that treating youths as adults, and 
thereby incarcerating them in adult penal institutions—as 
opposed to juvenile facilities—dramatically increases 
recidivism; and c) research proving that older adolescents are 
not as fully developed neurologically as adults and, as every 
parent knows innately, their ability to exercise sound judgment 
or control impulsive behavior is accordingly compromised.  This 
section will present a summary of these developments. 
The late twentieth century witnessed a major upsurge of 
criminality, both adult and juvenile.  Between 1965 and 1980, 
the juvenile violent crime and homicide rates doubled and, 
after a brief interlude, continued to increase until 1994.76  Not 
surprisingly, the legislative response was to selectively 
increase the number of children prosecuted as adults.77  Except 
Wyoming, however, no state raised the general juvenile 
delinquency age limitation.78  By the end of the century, the 
upsurge had reversed, and the juvenile crime rate plummeted.  
Between 1994 and 2003, the juvenile arrest rate for violent 
crimes decreased thirty-two percent79 and the trend has 
continued, albeit at a less dramatic rate. 
Thus, while in 1994 the arrest rate of children (ages 10-17) 
for violent crimes was over 500 per 100,000 (or, approximately 
one-half of one percent), by 2007 the violent crime arrest rate 
had decreased to slightly less than 300 per 100,000 (or, an 
arrest rate of one-third of one percent).80  The arrest rate for 
murder was even more pronounced, falling from 14 per 100,000 
children to 4 per 100,000.81  The decrease in the property crime 
index was equally dramatic, from 2,500 per 100,000 children in 
1994 (2.5%) to 1,250 per 100,000 children in 2007 (1.25%).82  
 
76. See BARRY C. FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN A NUTSHELL 
28-30 (2d ed. 2009). 
77. See id. at 30, chs. 6, 8. 
78. Technically an exception, Wyoming reduced the age limitation from 
nineteen to the national norm of eighteen.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201 
(2008).   
79. See FELD, supra note 76, at 29. 
80. See Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2008, JUV. JUST. BULL. 
(Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 
Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2009, at 1, 5, available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf. 
81. Id. at 6. 
82. Id. at 5. 
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Only half as many children committed property crimes in 2007 
as did thirteen years earlier.83  The available contemporary 
statistics also highlight the petty nature of juvenile crime, 
although that is not a new development.  For example, in 2007, 
200,300 children were arrested for larceny, 111,800 for 
vandalism, and 201,200 for disorderly conduct.84  In contrast, 
only 34,490 were arrested for robbery, 7,200 for arson, and 
3,580 for forcible rape.85 
The recent decrease in adolescent violent crime is reflected 
not only in the overall delinquency rate, but also in the number 
of New York children who are detained or placed in training 
schools (a violent youth is far more likely to be detained 
pending disposition and subsequently placed upon a finding of 
delinquency).  A ―snapshot‖ study by the Vera Institute of 
Justice found that in just two years, from 2004 to 2006, the 
number of alleged juvenile delinquents who were securely 
detained decreased by approximately one-third, from 2,985 to 
2,046 (excluding New York City).86  During the same period, 
the number of children placed by the Family Court with Office 
of Children and Family Services Training Schools statewide 
decreased from 2,234 to 1,777.87  The downward spiral 
continues: in 2008 only 813 children were placed by the Court 
in state training schools; the number of placements plummeted 
approximately sixty percent in four years.88  Nationally and 
locally, the juvenile crime rate has significantly decreased 
while at least in New York, the number of children 
 
83. Id. 
84. See id. at 3. 
85. See id.  The number of arrests presents a somewhat inflated picture 
in light of the fact that arrests do not necessarily resort in prosecutions and 
may evidence a degree of overcharging; other cases were undoubtedly 
dismissed after the filing of an accusatory instrument. 
86. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, WIDENING THE LENS 2008: A PANORAMIC VIEW 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.vera.org/download?file=1810/VERA%2BReport1_6_09.pdf.  The 
statistics cited above tallied the number of detentions, including children, 
who had been detained more than once; the number of different children 
detained in 2006 totaled 1,719.  Id. at 8. 
87. Id. at 17. 
88. See Admissions of Juvenile Delinquents and Juvenile Offenders to 
Institutions 1998-2008, CHILD WELFARE WATCH (Ctr. for an Urban Future, 
New York, N.Y.), Fall 2009, at 12, 12.  In 2004-2008, the number of 
delinquent youths placed in privately-operated residential non-secure 
programs remained constant, at approximately 800 per year.  Id. 
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incarcerated in facilities for juvenile delinquents has decreased 
dramatically. 
Recidivism is perhaps the most salient gauge of the 
juvenile justice system‘s effectiveness—in fact, a more accurate 
measure than the juvenile crime rate.  After all, a child of 
seventeen is likely to be back on the streets when in his 
twenties, regardless of the crime of conviction or the 
adjudicating court.  Surprisingly, until recently there were few, 
if any, studies that compared children who were treated as 
delinquents in family and juvenile courts—and accordingly 
placed in juvenile facilities—with their similar brethren, who 
were prosecuted as adults—and accordingly serve time in adult 
jails and penitentiaries.  That empirical void has now been 
filled, and the studies show conclusively that children who are 
incarcerated with adults have significantly higher recidivism 
rates, even when they have committed the same crimes in 
similar circumstances.89 
Perhaps the most interesting recidivism study—and the 
most relevant to this article—compared recidivism rates in 
New York and New Jersey.  New York maintains a juvenile 
delinquency age limitation of sixteen; New Jersey, however, 
adheres to the national norm of eighteen.90  Hence, a sixteen or 
seventeen-year-old who commits an offense will be adjudicated 
in a juvenile court in New Jersey, while his New York 
counterpart will be adjudicated and sentenced as an adult.  The 
study found that children prosecuted in New York were 85 
percent more likely to be re-arrested for violent crimes, and 44 
percent more likely to be re-arrested for felony property crimes, 
than similarly situated New Jersey teenagers.91  Thus, New 
York‘s approach is clearly counter-productive. 
The final development is the recent neurological and 
 
89. See generally, e.g., Andrea McGowan et al., Effects on Violence of 
Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Juveniles From the Juvenile 
Justice System to the Adult System: A Systematic Review, 32 AM. J. 
PREVENTATIVE MED. 7 (Supp. Apr. 2007); Lawrence Winner et al., The 
Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the 
Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 548 (1997). 
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-23 (West 2010). 
91. See JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUND, THE CHANGING 
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE ADULT 
CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E Zimring eds., 2006), in 
Birckhead, supra note 30, at 1461. 
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psychological studies relating to adolescent brain development.  
The news on that front is not entirely new.  From Aristotle to 
post-Freudian psychiatrists, experts have anecdotally 
documented and discussed adolescent impulsive, experimental, 
peer-driven, and immature or inappropriate behavior.92  What 
is new is the neurological research, including brain scanning 
technology, that has provided scientific proof of the age-old 
assumptions and experiences.93 
Of perhaps even greater significance is the influence of the 
high tech findings on juvenile justice, doctrinally and in 
practice, including the concept of ―diminished responsibility,‖ 
i.e., the principle that children and, to a lesser extent, young 
adults, should not be held as accountable as adults for their 
criminal activities. 
This short paper is not the place to outline, much less 
critique, the available literature.  Instead, I will rely solely on 
the United States Supreme Court, and its landmark 2005 case 
of Roper v. Simmons, which determined that persons under the 
age of eighteen could not be punished capitally.94  In reaching 
that conclusion, the Court made the following lengthy 
observations: 
 
First, as any parent knows and as the scientific 
and sociological studies respondent and his amici 
cite tend to confirm, ―[a] lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found 
in youth more often than in adults and are more 
understandable among the young.  These 
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions.‖  Johnson v. 
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993); see also Eddings 
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-116 (―Even the 
normal 16-year old customarily lacks the 
maturity of an adult‖).  It has been noted that 
―adolescents are overrepresented statistically in 
virtually every category of reckless behavior.‖  J. 
 
92. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 49-69 (2005) 
(providing an excellent contemporary description of adolescent psychology 
and its impact on juvenile criminality).  
93. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
94. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescents: A 
Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL 
REV. 339 (1992).  In recognition of the 
comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of 
juveniles, almost every State prohibits those 
under 18 years of age from voting, serving on 
juries, or marrying without parental consent.   
The second area of difference is that 
juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure.  Eddings, 455 U.S. at 
115 (―[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.  
It is a time and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to 
psychological damage‖).  This is explained in part 
by the prevailing circumstances that juveniles 
have less control, or less experience with control, 
over their own environment.  See Laurence 
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by 
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
1009, 1014 (2003) (―[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] 
lack the freedom that adults have to extricate 
themselves from a setting‖). 
The third broad difference is that the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as 
that of an adult.  The personality traits of 
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.  See 
generally E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND 
CRISIS (1968). 
These differences render suspect any 
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst 
offenders.  The susceptibility of juveniles to 
immature and irresponsible behavior means 
―their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.‖  Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality 
opinion).  Their own vulnerability and 
comparative lack of control over their immediate 
surroundings mean juveniles have a greater 
19
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claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to 
escape negative influences in their whole 
environment.  See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan J., dissenting).  
The reality that juveniles still struggle to define 
their identity means it is less supportable to 
conclude that even a heinous crime committed by 
a juvenile is evidence of irretrievable depraved 
character.  From a moral standpoint it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with 
those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists 
that a minor‘s character deficiencies will be 
reformed.  Indeed, ―[t]he relevance of youth as a 
mitigating factor derives from the fact that the 
signature qualifies of youth are transient; as 
individuals mature, the impetuousness and 
recklessness that may dominate in younger years 
can subside.‖  Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368; see also 
Steinberg & Scott, supra, at 1014 (―For most 
teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; 
they cease with maturity as individual identity 
becomes settled.  Only a relatively small 
proportion of adolescents who experiment in 
risky or illegal activities develop entrenched 
patterns of problem behavior that persist into 
adulthood‖).95 
 
Whether the crime is murder, as it was in Roper, or petit 
larceny, the most common crime committed by juveniles, the 
Supreme Court‘s analysis remains equally valid.  Holding 
sixteen and seventeen-year-old children as criminally 
accountable as adults is poor policy, a conclusion that has been 
validated and accepted scientifically and jurisprudently. 
 
 
95. Id. at 569-70 (some internal citations omitted) (some internal 
citations formatted from original). 
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Contemporary Developments and Age 
 
The contemporary sociological, psychological, and 
neurological studies, coupled with the juvenile crime rate 
reversal (from ―crime wave‖ proportions to an almost historical 
post-World War II low), has resulted in a broad reconsideration 
of juvenile justice policy and practice.  Roper, where the 
Supreme Court reversed its holding in Stanford v. Kentucky,96 
a case decided only sixteen years earlier, is one example of the 
new paradigm.  In the past few years, the application of harsh 
criminal sanctions to juveniles, such as life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole, have been questioned.97  To be 
sure, the dominant late-twentieth century ―get tough‖ attitude 
has not vanished, but has at least been partially eclipsed by the 
growing movement toward balance and amelioration. 
Revisiting the general jurisdictional age limitation is an 
integral, albeit limited, feature of the national movement: 
integral because it is central to juvenile justice, but limited 
because only three states subscribed to the lower threshold at 
the beginning of this century.  One of those three states, 
Connecticut, has since raised the jurisdictional age to 
eighteen.98  A second, North Carolina, has embarked on a 
similar path: bills to raise the age limitation to eighteen have 
been approved by the North Carolina House Judiciary 
Committee and are pending before the state Senate‘s Judiciary 
Committee.99  That leaves New York in isolation, as the only 
state in the Union which, to this date, has yet to take any 
legislative action. 
The Connecticut law that raised the State‘s jurisdictional 
age from sixteen to eighteen was enacted in 2001, and has 
become fully effective as of 2010.100  The recidivism studies and 
the decreasing crime rate were helpful to the Connecticut 
 
96. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).  
97. For example, the American Bar Association has opposed 
continuation of life without the possibility of parole. 
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (2009). 
99. See S. 1048, 2009-2010 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2009).  North Carolina 
has also established a task force to study and report on this issue.  See North 
Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
http://www.juvjus.state.nc.us/youthAccountabilityTaskForce/taskForce.html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2010).  A final report is due in January 2011. 
100. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121. 
21
1082 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
movement.  The key factor, however, was the prevalence, as 
publicized by the reform advocates, of non-serious offenses 
committed by children, as opposed to the commission of violent 
offenses.101  In every jurisdiction, the large majority of the 
crimes which children commit are property offenses, such as 
larceny, automobile theft, and vandalism, or, to a lesser extent, 
personal crimes such as misdemeanor assault.  For example, in 
the United States, 468,200 persons under the age of eighteen 
were arrested for larceny and 145,300 were charged with 
vandalism in 1992, while only 45,700 were charged with 
robbery, and only 3,300 were charged with murder or non-
negligent manslaughter.102  When the Connecticut legislative 
sponsors excluded the relatively small number of violent 
felonies from the proposed legislation (thus retaining criminal 
jurisdiction for those offenses), there was little perceived 
justification to continue general criminal jurisdiction.103  The 
relevant Connecticut Joint Legislative Committee Report 
explained the decision: 
 
Each year, 10,000 Connecticut children can be 
expected to go through the [then] adult system.  
About two of them will have killed someone.  We 
believe it is better to design a system for the 
10,000 than for the two.  There will still be 
provision to move violent youths to the adult 
system – we are not talking about giving anyone 
a pass for serious crimes.  The vast majority of 
minors, however, could be better held 
accountable in the juvenile system, where 
rehabilitative services have been proven to put 
youths back on the track, rather than the adult 
system, an ideal environment to create career 
criminals.  The experience of other states proves 
 
101. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
102. OFF. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP‘T 
OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 100 
(1995). 
103. The Connecticut Act grants unlimited initial jurisdiction to the 
juvenile court, but for the most violent offenses, mandates transfer to the 
criminal courts upon application of the prosecutor.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
46b-121. 
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this.104 
 
North Carolina has not yet followed Connecticut, or at 
least has not followed quickly.  However, a considerable 
movement for change has developed.105  A bill to raise the 
jurisdictional age limitation has been introduced in the North 
Carolina legislature, approved by its House Judiciary 
Committee, and forwarded to the Appropriations Committee.106  
There appears to be considerable momentum, although only 
time will tell whether North Carolina will join the forty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia where the jurisdictional age 
limitation is greater than sixteen, and leave New York as the 
last American holdout.107 
 
Implementation and Ramifications 
 
Adjusting the jurisdictional age limitation would be a 
relatively simple exercise.  In fact, the feat may be 
accomplished through a one-page bill amending a few sections 
in the Family Court Act and Penal Law.  The New York State 
Constitution was intentionally drafted to permit just such a 
simple amending procedure.  However, it is unlikely that the 
legislature would apply the precise existing juvenile justice 
structure to the older adolescent population, and it is 
questionable whether even the proponents of change would opt 
for strict equalization.  Moreover, an amendment would entail 
significant ramifications to the judicial and executive branches 
of government, both state and local, which the bill would need 
to address. 
 
104. H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile or Adult Jurisdiction?  Age Changes in the 
States, JUV. JUST. UPDATE, Dec./Jan. 2008, at 1, 2 (quoting CONN. JUVENILE 
JURISDICTION & IMPLEMENTATION COMM.). 
105. See, e.g., Birckhead, supra note 30, at 1493-94. 
106. H.R. 1414 (N.C. 2009). 
107. Illinois has historically maintained age seventeen as the cutoff.  
Recently, however, there has been an interesting compromise.  The state has 
raised the jurisdictional age to eighteen for misdemeanors and has 
established a task force to consider adding felony arrests.  See Jeff Long, 
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The most important decision, assuming an increase in the 
general age jurisdictional limitation, is where to draw the line.  
No state defines juvenile delinquency to include every criminal 
act committed by every person under the age of eighteen (or 
seventeen).  The universal exclusions include homicide, 
attempted murder, aggravated assault,108 and first degree 
sexual offenses.109  Beyond the list of obvious ―horror‖ crimes, 
there is a striking lack of a consensus regarding other violent 
offenses committed by the upper juvenile age group, which 
should fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.  As has 
been noted, some states permit ―direct filing‖ in criminal court 
of the more egregious violent charges, such as robbery; others 
preclude criminal prosecution; while still others permit 
―transfer‖ of such cases in the discretion of the juvenile court or 
in the discretion of the prosecutorial authority.110 
Given a blank slate, New York would have divergent 
models to choose from.  This state has, however, already opted 
for a modified ―direct file‖ system for children under the age of 
sixteen: the Juvenile Offender Act, enacted in 1978, 
encompasses children over the age of fourteen charged with 
specified violent felonies, including robbery (first and second 
degree) and first degree sexual offenses, as well as children 
over the age of thirteen charged with murder.111  Such cases 
are initially filed in the criminal courts but are later ―removed‖ 
to the Family Court once the child is convicted of a lesser 
crime, or ―removed‖ for other reasons in the discretion of the 
court (usually with the consent of the relevant District 
Attorney).112 
It would be impractical, if not unthinkable, to treat 
children above the age of sixteen who have committed a 
juvenile offense more leniently than their younger brethren.  
Ergo, the definition of a ―juvenile offender‖ would undoubtedly 
be amended to encompass persons under the age of eighteen.  A 
more difficult question is whether to expand the list with 
additional violent felonies, i.e., to augment the definition for 
 
108. Defined as first degree assault in New York.  See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
120.10 (McKinney 2009). 
109. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 28, at 37-48. 
110. See id. 
111. See Act of July 20, 1978, 1978 N.Y. Laws 1, 2. 
112. Id. 
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the older age group.113  (A juvenile offender would hence be a 
child over the age of thirteen, or fourteen, or sixteen, depending 
upon the crime charged.)  One further complication is the 
unique sentencing structure for juvenile offenders, which is 
more stringent than a delinquency disposition but less 
stringent than an adult sentence.114  The question remains 
whether the sentencing structure should be altered for older 
adolescents.  Moreover, the complicated procedures governing 
the transfer of juvenile offenders from state training schools to 
prisons would also need to be amended if the jurisdictional age 
was increased.115 
Another issue in raising the jurisdictional age limitation 
concerns prosecution.  In virtually every other state, the 
criminal court prosecutorial authority also prosecutes juvenile 
delinquency cases in the juvenile or family court.116  This is not 
so in New York.  Prosecution117 is almost always the 
responsibility of a civil authority, namely the local County 
Attorney or Corporation Counsel.118  However, for the more 
serious violent felony cases, known as ―designated felonies,‖ the 
District Attorney may enter into an agreement with the civil 
authority whereby the District Attorney assumes prosecution119 
and, of course, would then prosecute the juvenile offender in 
the criminal courts.  New York could choose to continue the 
present pattern, which would shift the bulk of cases involving 
fifteen and sixteen-year-old children to the county attorneys 
and corporation counsels, or it could alter the present 
 
113. A ―juvenile offender‖ would hence need to be defined as a child over 
the age of thirteen, or fourteen, or sixteen, depending upon the crime 
charged. 
114. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05 (McKinney 2009). 
115. At the other end of the crime spectrum, virtually every state 
excludes traffic offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.  That exclusion 
would also be automatic in New York, which, under the Family Court Act, a 
―juvenile delinquent‖ is defined as a person under the specified age who 
commits a ―crime,‖ thereby excluding all offenses less than misdemeanors, 
including traffic infractions, such as running a red light or speeding.  See 
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2008). 
116. H. Ted Rubin, Prosecutors in Juvenile Court: Compatibility and 
Conflict, JUV. JUST. UPDATE, Feb./Mar. 2008, at 1. 
117. The Family Court Act uses the term ―presentment.‖ 
118. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 254. 
119. See id. § 254-a. 
25
1086 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
arrangement by adopting a bifurcated prosecutorial system.120   
The impact of expanded juvenile delinquency jurisdiction 
on the judiciary is obvious, although the precise weight is 
difficult to gauge.  Close to half of the arrests of all children 
under the age of eighteen involve youngsters who are sixteen or 
seventeen.121  Hence, the Family Court‘s juvenile delinquency 
caseload could potentially almost double.  However, the more 
serious violent cases would likely remain within the criminal 
court structure, and those cases place a greater demand on 
judicial resources than the law seriously cares.  The caseload 
allocation between criminal and family courts would depend 
upon where the Legislature drew the line between ―juvenile 
delinquents‖ and ―adults‖ for criminal purposes.  Regardless of 
the allocation, however, the Family Court and the agencies 
that service the Court, would witness a major upsurge in 
juvenile delinquency cases—cases that constitute 
approximately ten percent of the overall caseload.122  That 
increase would be balanced by a commensurate decrease in the 
criminal courts‘ caseload. 
An adjustment to the age limitation would also place an 
increased burden on post-dispositional resources.  At present, 
an older adolescent offender is detained in local jails and, when 
incarcerated, is housed in local jails (for misdemeanors) or in 
State Department of Correctional prisons (for felonies).  
Children under the age of sixteen are detained in local 
detention facilities, and, when deprived of their freedom, are 
housed mainly in state training schools operated by the State 
Office of Children and Family Services, or alternatively, in 
private residential programs.123  Adjusting the age would 
 
120. A bifurcated prosecutorial system could involve an arrangement 
whereby one prosecutorial authority handles cases when the respondent is 
under the age of sixteen at the time of the commission of the offense, while a 
different authority prosecutes those individuals over the age of sixteen.  
However, this bifurcated system would create a complicated scheme, 
particularly if a case included co-respondents of different ages. 
121. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
122. Surprisingly, in recent years the Legislature has significantly 
increased the Family Court‘s jurisdiction without a commensurate increase in 
its resources.  Examples include raising the age of persons in need of 
supervision, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney 2009) (raising the age from 
sixteen to eighteen), and requiring frequent permanency hearings when a 
child is in placement, see id. § 1089. 
123. See id. § 353.3 (McKinney 2008). 
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consequently increase the training school and detention center 
population, and decrease the jail and prison population, 
although the exact re-allocation would, again, depend upon 
where the Legislature ―drew the line.‖  Given significantly 
decreasing crime rates and a renewed emphasis on community 
based services, Office of Children and Family Service facilities 
are under-populated, and the agency has consequently had to 
close residential facilities.124  Hence, the system could 
accommodate an increased population.  Some physical 
expansion might nevertheless be needed, and operating costs 
would surely increase.  Non-secure detention is available in 
every county in the State, but would probably need 
augmentation.  Secure detention poses a more difficult 
problem.  The number of facilities is very small and they are 
often far removed from a given geographic area.  Even a 
limited expansion would pose financial and logistical problems. 
Finally, I hazzard a very rough generalization of the 
overall operational fiscal repercussions.  The number of arrests 
 
124. See Press Release, N.Y. Office of Children & Family Servs. 
(―OCFS‖), New York State Office of Children and Family Services 
Accelerating Transformation of State Juvenile Justice System (Jan. 11, 
2008), available at 
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/news/2008/2008_01_11_juvenilejusticetrans
formation.asp (stating that the Commissioner of OCFS ―announced the 
closing of six underutilized residential facilities‖ and the partial closing of 
several additional facilities).  The OCFS residential facilities or training 
schools are not problem-free.  In fact, the United States Department of 
Justice has recently cited the agency for physically abusing the children in its 
custody, maintaining an inadequate monitoring system, overusing 
psychotropic drugs, and lacking sufficient mental health staff.  See Letter 
from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Att‘y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep‘t 
of Justice, to Hon. David A. Paterson, N.Y. Governor (Aug. 8, 2009), available 
at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/NY_juvenile_facilities_findlet_08-
14-2009.pdf.  OCFS is attempting to address the sobering findings and will 
presumably remedy or at least partially remedy the situation.  In any event, 
children who are placed in state custody enjoy greater constitutional rights 
than adult prisoners.  See, e.g., Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1437 n.3 
(9th Cir. 1987) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (―The ‗evolving standards of 
decency‘ against which courts evaluate the constitutionality of the conditions 
certainly provide greater protection for juveniles than for adults.‖).  The 
sixteen-year-old incarcerated in a local or state prison faces even worse 
conditions, and of course the great majority of youngsters who are found 
guilty of engaging in criminal conduct are not placed or incarcerated.  The 
jurisdictional age limitation and the conditions of confinement are distinct 
and separate issues. 
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and cases would not change to any significant extent and the 
total governmental expenditures should accordingly stay 
roughly comparable to the contemporary system.  Raising the 
jurisdictional age, however, would trigger a significant 
financial reallocation.  Misdemeanor cases, which constitute a 
large majority of the proceedings, would move from the locally 
funded city and justice courts to the state funded Family Court.  
A substantial number of felony proceedings would likewise be 
heard in Family Court, as opposed to the County or Supreme 
Courts.  Defense costs would be borne by the State, which 
funds the representation of children in Family Court, as 
opposed to the counties, which largely fund criminal defense 
representation.  Prosecution services are primarily county 
funded in both Family and Criminal Courts, and should 
therefore remain relatively constant.  Detention and 
incarceration of adults convicted of misdemeanor violations are 
primarily local or county charges, whereas the detention and 
custodial placement of children are State charges.  In sum, 
unless the current fiscal rules and policies are modified, raising 
the jurisdictional age would result in significant State fiscal 
obligations—judicial and executive—with a commensurate 
decrease of the local funding burden.  The financial 
reallocations would be relatively gradual, since full 




Juvenile and Family Courts were established throughout 
the country at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
Originally, their jurisdictional scope was limited to children 
under the age of sixteen, but by the end of the twentieth 
century, virtually every state had expanded jurisdiction to 
encompass sixteen and seventeen-year-old children; in fact, the 
progression was largely completed by 1940.  New York has 
followed the national norm by raising, albeit belatedly, the 
jurisdictional age for every cause of action, save juvenile 
delinquency.  For delinquency, and only for delinquency, this 
State has adhered to the original, circa 1900, restriction.  A 
major endeavor to raise New York‘s jurisdictional age was 
mounted in the 1930s, but it fell short.  Subsequently, a similar 
movement almost succeeded at the 1961 State Constitutional 
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Convention, which established the Family Court; but when the 
dust settled, New York maintained the age restriction as a 
―temporary‖ measure pending a promised legislative initiative.  
The ―temporary‖ compromise has remained in effect for forty-
eight years. 
The reasons for the national age-eighteen consensus are 
not difficult to decipher.  The overwhelming percentage of 
criminal acts committed by adolescents are minor, and 
predominately include larceny, vandalism, auto theft, and 
misdemeanor assault.  The recidivism rate is low—nationally, 
approximately two-thirds of all juveniles who are arrested 
never re-offend.  Ergo, it makes little sense to subject these 
children to criminal prosecution, penalties, and records, as 
opposed to juvenile court remedies, including when 
appropriate, placement in a residential facility.  For the small 
minority of children who have committed violent felony acts, 
every State provides a mechanism to shift prosecution to the 
adult criminal court.  The public is thereby protected, while 
most children are appropriately adjudicated in a more 
ameliorative environment, one which focuses on the child‘s best 
interests and maintains a high degree of confidentiality.  The 
national consensus has been recently affirmed by several 
developments, including a significant decrease in the juvenile 
crime rate, studies proving that children who are prosecuted as 
adults—as in New York—have far higher recidivison rates, and 
twenty-first century neurological research proving the 
diminished judgment capacity, competency, and hence, 
responsibility, of adolescents. 
There is no reason why New York cannot, or should not, 
join the rest of the nation.  We would, after all, be the 
penultimate State or, perhaps, the very last State.  The public 
benefits are manifest, as are the benefits to New York‘s 
children.  The only missing element, at least thus far, has been 
the lack of political will, both at the community and the 
legislative levels.  It is surely time to commence a public and 
legislative dialogue, and to seriously consider the advantages of 
increasing the jurisdictional age limitation. 
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